CHERI in out-of-order microarchitectures
summary
An open-source CHERI RISC-V stack is running a full CHERI-BSD OS on a Stratix 10 superscalar out-of-order core called CHERI-tuber, using a ported Clang/LLVM toolchain, QEMU and formal specs. Pointers grow to 16-byte capabilities with an explicit validity tag and top 8 bytes of metadata; a demo buffer overflow triggers an in-address-space security exception instead of corrupting adjacent memory. Tooling includes formal sale-model specs and a working hardware prototype, and the mitigation is shown as an actual, reproducible hardware trap.
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chapters (5)
- 0:00Introduction to CHERI
- 2:51System demonstration
- 4:26Pointer architecture
- 5:17Mitigating buffer overflows
- 8:10Closing and Q&A
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