Secure Calling Conventions for CHERI Capability Machines in Practice (Work in P...
summary
Proposes a concrete design that reconciles theoretical secure calling conventions with real CHERI-RISC-V constraints by introducing a reserve stack to avoid the 16 KB limit caused by CHERI’s capability compression, provides an LLVM implementation of selected conventions, and runs microbenchmarks measuring execution cost, stack usage and binary size; results are work-in-progress, no hardware yet (emulator and gem5 trace plans), and initial findings show nontrivial overheads and compatibility challenges that still need quantification.
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:05CHERI capability machines
- 4:59Secure compartmentalization goal
- 9:22Secure calling conventions theory
- 11:09Capability compression challenge
- 13:22Stack splitting design
- 16:14LLVM implementation
- 18:40Return encapsulation design
- 20:23Benchmarking and compatibility
- 21:03Conclusion
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