"Say I'm in public...I don't want my nudes to pop up." User Threat Models for Using
summary
Interviews with N=18 U.S. adult users show vault apps (iOS hidden album, Google Photos locked folder, Snapchat My Eyes Only and standalone disguised “calculator” apps) primarily store intimate photos, nonsexual body pics, IDs and ad hoc password lists. Users deploy them against shoulder surfing and phone sharing or parental snooping, not against skilled attackers, and treat them as a way to prevent context collapse. Participants want extra authentication options and optional friction; existing vaults fail against technically proficient adversaries.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (9)
- 0:00Vault apps introduction
- 1:54Research gaps on Vault apps
- 2:58Study methodology
- 4:02Assets in Vault apps
- 6:30Threats users fear
- 8:38Adversaries and exposure
- 9:21Authentication tradeoffs
- 10:26Key takeaways
- 11:31Design recommendations
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