Using DICE Attestation for SEV and SNP Hardware Rooted Attestation
summary
Proposal uses DICE to give confidential VMs a cryptographic workload identity without a TPM by chaining per-layer device ID key pairs into a CDI chain and using the AMD secure processor’s getkey/quote as layer‑0. Prototype work leverages the Android open‑dice C library and an open-dice driver to pass raw dice bytes into userspace; grub/ovmf need light integration. Tradeoffs: only layer‑0 is vendor specific, fewer TEE lines of code than a vTPM, and support for forking distinct container identities.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Introduction to dice
- 0:24Defining attestation goals
- 1:56What is the dice standard
- 3:44The dice layered approach
- 7:38Practical dice workflows
- 9:45Validating the dice chain
- 13:09Implementation and recap
- 15:12Q&A session
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