Unifying Confidential Attestation
summary
Compares SEV-ES, SEV-SNP and Intel TDX measurements and proposes two concrete unification paths: a secure vTPM rooted in hardware (benefit: reuse existing TPM tooling; challenge: provisioning SRKs and persistence) and a user-space Confidential Containers Attestation Agent using measured direct boot (benefit: modular KBC plugins; challenge: limited to initrd-style boots). SVSM/VMPL on SNP enables a tamper-resistant vTPM, TDX lacks PCR parity so mapping or enclave-based vTPM is needed, and an ephemeral TPM model helps sidestep long-term state issues.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Start
- 5:21$390 Secure Execution
- 6:33Unification
- 8:56Firmware (2)
- 19:35Kernel
- 20:50Initrd
- 25:20Application
- 29:55Further research
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