Virtual TPM based attestation for Intel Trust Domain Extensions
summary
Introduces a working vTPM design for Intel TDX that adds a vtpm TD plus changes in KVM/QEMU, OVMF (TDVF) and a guest Linux TPM driver, uses shared buffers and AES-GCM for encrypted TPM commands, and embeds the TD report inside the vTPM’s EK x509 with TD report so verifiers check TD integrity. Prototype uses SPDM secure session mutual auth, observes ~28 TPM calls during boot (≈21 PCR extensions), stores NV in the vtpm TD (non‑persistent by default) and runs end‑to‑end.
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chapters (7)
- 0:00Introduction to vTPM attestation
- 3:35Need for virtual TPM in TDX
- 6:01vTPM architecture for TDX
- 12:52vTPM runtime flow and secure session
- 17:52Challenges and solutions in vTPM
- 20:04Implementation details and components
- 25:09Summary and conclusion
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