Systematic Evaluation of Randomized Cache Designs against Cache Occupancy

on YouTube ↗15m

" summary

Compares five designs—CEASER, CEASER-S, MIRAGE, ScatterCache, SassCache—using a uniform benchmarking strategy across multiple replacement policies and shows performance differences (some randomized designs even beat the baseline under certain policies). Implements three attacks: a covert channel, process fingerprinting, and a T‑table AES key recovery via cache occupancy; the AES recovery succeeds and is the first full key recovery on a randomized cache using occupancy, with tests at 40%, 50%, 70% occupancy and guessing‑entropy measurements. Finds MIRAGE especially vulnerable and SassCache most resilient.

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" chapters (11)

1. 0:00Randomized cache designs intro
2. 1:38Cache attacks background
3. 2:41Cache occupancy explained
4. 3:46Motivation for evaluation
5. 5:50Benchmarking strategy
6. 6:54Performance impact analysis
7. 7:55Covert channel setup & results
8. 9:43Process fingerprinting findings
9. 11:12AES key recovery method
10. 14:02Key recovery results
11. 14:44Summary of findings

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