Secure Cache Designs: State of the Art and ...
summary
Overview of concrete results and prototypes assessing secure cache designs with numbers and attacks. Shows that Prime‑prune‑probe reduces profiling time by about three orders of magnitude on small victims and that prior claims for Caesar rekeying (68 years) collapse to attackable windows; some Caesar variants lose up to 20 orders. Presents a new prototype scatter and split securely with configurable coverage like 63% or 39% that forces profiling to fail after roughly six victim observations by making many victim ways unreachable.
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chapters (15)
- 0:00Secure cache designs intro
- 1:03CPU caches as side channels
- 3:08How modern caches work
- 5:13Prime and probe attack
- 7:21Cross-core attacks via LLC
- 8:25Partition-based secure caches
- 13:42Intel Cache Allocation Technology (CAT)
- 16:33Randomized cache designs
- 17:41Scatter cache and Caesar design
- 22:37Security flaws in Caesar
- 24:01Phantom and Prime+Probe attack
- 27:56Mirage cache probabilistic balancing
- 30:26Collapse Hydra cache with TTL
- 31:30Scatter and Split Secure design
- 37:25Future outlook and challenges
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