Page Cache Attacks: Microarchitectural Attacks on Flawless Hardware
summary
Operating-system page cache acts as a software cache and yields non-destructive probes via APIs like mincore and QueryWorkingSet, enabling timing side channels used to build covert channels, UI overlays and RNG recovery. Practical results include a covert channel of 81.16 KB/s on Linux and 100.11 KB/s on Windows, a PHP RNG seed recovered within 1 millisecond after detecting microtime, eviction optimized to ~149 milliseconds on Linux, and kernel mitigation via mincore changes in Linux 5.1.4.
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chapters (18)
- 0:00Intro
- 0:15Micro Architecture
- 1:00CPU Cache
- 3:07Application Cache Attack
- 8:37Countermeasures
- 10:55Parallel Universe
- 13:13Page Cache
- 13:57Simplified Page Cache
- 15:50Observing Page Cache State
- 17:39Reset Page Cache State
- 18:39Linux
- 20:30Windows
- 21:51Sidechannel
- 23:48Pseudorandom Number Generator
- 26:37UI Redressing
- 29:34Windows countermeasures
- 32:37Performance optimization
- 33:20Conclusion
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