Harness: Transparent and Lightweight Protection of Vehicle Control on...
summary
Harness isolates a minimal vehicle-control domain using hardware virtualization (ARM stage‑2 paging) and a hypervisor module called the low visor to run car service, system car apps and HWC as enclaves, mediating binder IPC and shared memory via token ownership and an AIDL-based authentication gate. It secures GUI with graphic-buffer isolation and vertio device binding and validates touch by replaying hardware samples. Prototype on Raspberry Pi 5 (≈9.3k LOC) works and shows 3.7x LMbench slowdown, ~20% app/touch latency, <4% memory increase, binder +60% latency and ~22% car-API overhead.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Harness project intro
- 1:56Threat model
- 3:01Design goals
- 4:03Isolation via hardware virtualization
- 5:49Protection domains
- 6:31Challenge: secure memory sharing
- 8:40Challenge: protecting Binder IPC
- 10:45Challenge: securing HMI
- 13:54Implementation setup
- 14:40Performance results
- 16:26Summary
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