Supporting Live Migration of Confidential VMs in KVM
summary
Design proposes SEV‑SNP live migration using a VMPL0 SVSM that generates an SVSM-generated attestation report containing the hash of a newly created public key, the source validates that report and returns a transport key wrapped with public key, then private guest pages are packaged by KVM→SVSM with GPA and validation metadata, encrypted and sent to destination which decrypts and restores memory; vtpm state is packaged, SVSM itself is restarted on target, post‑copy is deferred and replay protection uses selectable AEAD like GCM.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Introduction to live migration
- 3:40Need for a common migration API
- 7:58Use cases for live migration
- 10:02Performance and protocol details
- 12:28Steady state migration design
- 14:18SVSM state handling
- 16:26Security and attestation policies
- 19:14Q&A and future discussion
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