Towards unified confidential computing ABIs
summary
Proposal claims Linux should host a common confidential‑computing ABI and enforces it via kernel ABI docs; implemented a configfs TSM register that creates per‑instance configfs nodes, transports vendor attestation formats as an opaque blob transport, and normalizes Intel/AMD differences by treating the payloads uniformly. Both Intel and AMD paths use a 64-byte report field to bootstrap larger hashed payloads. The code is upstreamed (TDX and SE guest drivers) and currently works as a simple, reviewable common transport.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (4)
- 0:00Introduction and motivation
- 5:20Unified attestation report transport
- 7:32Other confidential computing drivers
- 11:04Future of unified ABIs
related talks
36mEverybody is talking about Confidential Computing - the minimum Devs should know
01h 05mConfidential Computing for RISC-V-based Platforms
42mSponsored Session: Confidential Computing - New Capabilities for New Workloads
37mIt's All About Trust: Why Confidential Computing Matters
36mCTO Panel: The Impact of Confidential Computing with Intel, Azure, AMD & NVIDIA
28mSealed for All: Multi-Party Confidential Computing, No Trust- 37mIt's All About Trust: Why Confidential Computing Matters
31mConfidential Computing for RISC-V-based Platforms