Common Myths about PQ Migration and Standards Busted!
summary
Claims urgent migration for national security systems with NSM-10 2035 deadline, shows concrete interoperability and performance blockers: Kyber512 public key ~3x larger than current equivalents and Dilithium2 signatures ~38x larger than comparable ECC, warns UDP-based protocols (IPsec, DNSSEC) and firmware signing need immediate attention, cites usable tools and standards like NIST SP 800-208 and NCCoE project (special pub 1800-38A) and notes NIST drafts due this summer as the trigger for broad adoption planning.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (8)
- 0:00Introduction to PQ migration
- 1:35Myth one quantum computers far off
- 11:35Myth two drop in replacements
- 21:53Myth three symmetric algorithms safe
- 24:45Myth four use PQ algorithms now
- 29:44Myth five transition plan exists
- 38:00Takeaways and next steps
- 39:31Q&A session
related talks
13mNavigating the Quantum Readiness Journey: Open-Source Cryptography, PKI and Signing Tools
22mPost Quantum Policy and Roadmap of the BSI
33mTransitioning National Security Systems to a Post Quantum Future
24mOvercoming Challenges in Post-Quantum Cryptography Adoption
44mPost-quantum cryptography migration strategy for cloud services
01h 02mNIST Post-Quantum Cryptography Update
23mReal-World Post-Quantum Migrations: Lessons Learned and Performance Results
41mPreparing for and migrating to a world with PQC