Post Quantum Policy and Roadmap of the BSI
summary
German federal policy treats PQC migration as urgent with a 2026 migration strategy milestone and a working hypothesis of usable quantum computers in the early 2030s. Recommendations mandate inventorying crypto, favor hybrid KEM/signature deployments (Kyber + Dilithium/Sphincs+/XMSS/LMS listed in the open source "ban" library), prefer security categories 3 and 5, and design for cryptographic agility. Roadmap includes concrete hybrid KDF/concatenation guidance, TLS and OpenPGP proof‑of‑concepts, and contractor implementations.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00BSI post-quantum policy intro
- 1:07Quantum threat urgency
- 3:12BSI risk assessment timeline
- 5:42Policy milestones plan
- 7:08BSI PQC guidelines
- 8:13Cryptographic inventory hybrid
- 9:38Technical guidelines schemes
- 11:04Future updates standardization
- 13:11Hybrid cryptography practice
- 15:42Open-source PQ implementations
- 17:27Quantum key distribution limits
- 18:54Summary closing
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