Separate but Together: Integrating Remote Attestation into TLS
summary
Protocol integrates TLS 1.3 extensions with remote attestation by hashing handshake messages into a new linking hash that the TEE signs alongside the TLS certificate signature, tying attestation to ephemeral session secrets rather than the long‑term key. Implementation uses standard TLS wire format, adds no extra round trips, preserves throughput equal to vanilla TLS, and increases latency only from larger messages. Works with Intel TDX, AMD SEV, TPMs and prevents relay attacks while allowing independent failures.
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chapters (7)
- 0:00Trusted execution environments
- 1:43Remote attestation in practice
- 3:27Attestation in TLS handshake
- 7:02Relay attacks risks
- 9:10Flaws linking attestation to keys
- 11:18Attestation and session secrets
- 14:29TLS plus RA summary
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