Minos : A Lightweight and Dynamic Defense against Traffic Analysis in...
summary
Minos implements a programmable-switch defense on Tofino1 that performs line‑rate header encryption and flow mixing to defend website and IoT fingerprinting. It adapts the PRINCE cipher via encryption round compression to fit a 12‑stage pipeline, achieves >94 Gbps encryption with only ~55% SRAM and no ALU/TCAM use, and uses a dynamic scheduler plus priority dummy queues to insert dummies. Evaluation shows attacker accuracy drops below 20% with roughly one‑tenth the overhead of prior defenses.
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chapters (13)
- 0:00Minos introduction and motivation
- 1:22Traffic analysis attacks and defenses
- 3:53Minos design overview
- 6:22Proxy module encryption challenges
- 8:30Schedule module flow interleaving
- 11:17Traffic morphing dummy packets
- 12:40Hardware implementation
- 13:23Performance evaluation setup
- 14:27Schedule module latency
- 14:49Traffic morphing rate control
- 15:10Performance comparison
- 15:31Website fingerprinting defense
- 16:57Conclusion
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