Bootloaders Under Fire: Real-World Threats and Practical Defenses
summary
Finds four exploit examples showing concrete failures: FIT images execute before crypto check enabling arbitrary code via the U-Boot environment, file systems and complex parsers produce crashes, leaked factory images disable verified boot, and missing runtime hardening leaves return-oriented attacks possible. Implements fuzzing in barebox and ships five to six fuzzers that uncover dozens of bugs, adds MMU page protections (U-Boot patch upstream last month, barebox enables by default on ARM32) and a kconfig-driven is_allowed macro plus security-policy files to enforce lockdowns at runtime.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Bootloader hardening challenges
- 2:29U-Boot env misconfigs exploited
- 10:59Bootloader file system flaws
- 19:32Barebox auto-probing flaw
- 24:06Factory leaks and lifecycle risks
- 29:04Security policies for bootloaders
- 34:45Future bootloader security challenges
- 35:16Q&A on kernel images
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