Secure Interrupt delivery: Lessons Learned from Alternate Injection Enablement
summary
SEV‑SNP Alternate Injection is enabled end‑to‑end: KVM gets a separate alternate injection enabled pass to isolate SVSM-managed interrupts, SVSM implements APIC emulation plus Restricted Injection and performs VMPL switches to deliver VMPL2 interrupts, and a doorbell page bypasses KVM’s local APIC path. OVMF/XE‑APIC vs X2APIC boot timing is changed (RFC to move X2APIC enablement earlier), KVM patches build on Roy Hopkins’ multi‑VMPL work and restricted injection commits, and a combined KVM/guest trace tool proves the flow during tests.
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chapters (7)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:28Secure interrupt delivery basics
- 4:26Auto injection overview
- 7:02KVM design for auto injection
- 10:43OVMF protocol mismatch
- 12:11X2APIC mode discussion
- 16:11Status update and Q&A
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