Discussion: TDISP, VM migration, and paravisors
summary
Compares two concrete architectures for TDISP-based PCI device trust and VM migration: a paravisor-provided TIS device that handles attestation versus pushing discovery into the kernel via a new CPUID leaf or a kernel PCI/TSM driver. Shows why ring‑0 drivers (example: AMD PSP/CCP driver flow, OVMF boot implications) are needed to acquire attestation material, flags ARM’s lack of CPUID as a blocker, and concludes there is no implemented cross‑vendor solution yet — this is a feature‑discovery design session.
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chapters (6)
- 0:00Introduction and context
- 2:06Paravvisor vs SVSM models
- 7:22Trust model and threat assumptions
- 13:04Future deployment and ownership
- 18:25Feature discovery problem
- 23:23Q&A and next steps
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