Keynote: Who cares about Democracy?
summary
Analyzes two concrete cryptographic bugs: a broken shuffle proof and a broken decryption proof in the SCYTL/SwissPost code that let a mixnet produce convincing-but-falsified proofs, and shows NSW iVote runs similar code with a single mix server and a secret bulletin board so votes can be linked or manipulated. Describes a real pilot: a San Francisco risk-limiting audit of a preferential (IRV) race using Philip Stark’s methods and Australian preferential analyzers, demonstrates the audit process works on postal ballots, and argues Senate counts lack any mandated statistical auditing.
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chapters (19)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:36Title
- 1:13Outline
- 3:01Interim verifiable election system
- 11:00Math
- 17:05Summary
- 18:14Limitations
- 21:07I Vote
- 27:16NDA
- 28:45Decription Proof
- 31:42What can you do
- 32:47Victoria
- 35:35Electronic Counting
- 44:37Citizen Audits
- 46:22Australian Senate Count
- 50:12Election Auditing
- 50:58The simple solution
- 51:57State of Australian election software
- 53:54New project idea
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