The Return of Software Vulnerabilities in the Brazilian Voting Machines
summary
Detailed security analysis of Brazil’s voting software finds practical exploits: install cards that install 50 machines use AES keys hard-coded in firmware and files, allowing decryption and signature forging; the DRV shuffle uses a C RNG with only 3600 seeds discoverable from timestamps, enabling vote-order reconstruction and ballot secrecy breaks; unsigned shared libraries permit arbitrary code execution on machines, letting attackers corrupt logs, prevent or alter vote storage, and produce forged result files — attacks are demonstrated and largely practical at scale.
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chapters (7)
- 0:00Introduction and context
- 10:04Public security tests overview
- 23:12Ballot secrecy vulnerabilities
- 34:35Software installation attacks
- 38:31System flaws and limitations
- 41:21Recommendations and future steps
- 44:06Q&A session
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