All Your Apple are Belong to Us: Unique Identification and Cross-Device Tracking of Apple Devices
summary
Study demonstrates concrete methods to fingerprint and link Apple devices across reboots using public APIs, hardware identifiers and disclosed vulnerabilities including CVE-2018-4322. It extracts persistent IDs (Bluetooth/Wi‑Fi MACs via ARP cache and Bluetooth daemon IPC), reads protected registries and jailbreak-only routes for serials, and exploits multiple iOS XPC/IPC flaws to recover Apple IDs and link devices; experiments build a device‑graph algorithm that successfully clusters multi‑device users and shows fixes and differential‑privacy mitigations.
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chapters (7)
- 0:00Start
- 1:46Motivation of Cross Device Tracking
- 19:28Vulnerabilities
- 28:05Sms Message Database
- 32:49Feasible Solutions
- 38:00Conclusion
- 39:24Reference
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