How Smartcard Payment Systems Fail
summary
EMV deployment proves fragile: researchers build a laptop-controlled man-in-the-middle PIN bypass that lets stolen chip cards approve transactions with PIN 000000, and they instrument cards and buy ATMs to show many terminals emit predictable or counter-like “unpredictable” numbers. Banks often fail to check the card ATC, enabling preplay/randomness failures that replay future transactions; criminals ship trojan terminals from the factory and tap PED backs, causing real losses (cases include mass petrol-station thefts and repeated €3,300 dunnings).
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chapters (16)
- 0:00Intro
- 1:13The EMV protocol suite
- 2:13Concept of operations
- 5:25Fraud history, UK
- 9:22Attack the crypto
- 11:08Attack the optimisations
- 12:47What about a false terminal?
- 15:23Attacks in the real world
- 33:01A normal EMV transaction
- 34:28Blocking the 'No-PIN' attack
- 39:05Card Authentication Protocol
- 42:25CAP attacks through wicked shops
- 47:26The preplay attack
- 51:41Back end failures too...
- 53:26Attack scale
- 56:14Broader lessons
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