Making PQ Signatures work in the WebPKI
summary
Post‑quantum drop‑in signatures blow up TLS handshakes (hash‑based up to ~50 KB, ML‑DSA ~14–20 KB), so the proposal evaluates practical mitigations: Merkle tree certificates replace a full chain with an inclusion proof <1 KB, batching issuance (demo CA issues 5‑minute batches, signed tree heads) to keep per‑connection payload near ~2 KB with ML‑DSA. Other options: omit intermediates (saves ~3 KB), use KEMs for the transcript, or mix on‑ramp candidates (Mayo/UOV shave ~3 KB). Experiments and deployment tradeoffs remain underway.
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chapters (14)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:25WebPKI signatures recap
- 8:39PQ signature schemes
- 13:34Optimizing certificate chains
- 17:52Merkle tree certificates
- 23:15How Merkle trees work
- 29:40Certificate issuance process
- 33:33Demo: Merkle certificate creation
- 39:03Transparency service concerns
- 42:42DNSSEC alternative
- 47:02Private PKI limits
- 48:05Revocation and trust anchors
- 50:35Q&A
- 54:32Closing remarks
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