Quantum-Safe TLS in Practice With Open Quantum Safe & OpenSSL 3
summary
Demo environment uses OpenSSL 3.5 on a Fedora 43 container and builds liboqs plus oqs-provider 0.10 to add candidate algorithms. A self‑signed ML‑DSA CA/leaf chain is generated and a TLS 1.3 server/client handshake succeeds with hybrid X25519+ML‑KEM768 negotiated; TLS 1.2 fails. Key concrete costs: classical ECDSA cert ≈599 bytes vs ML‑DSA leaf ≈7 KB and full chain ≈15 KB; SLH‑DSA signatures ≈7 KB while SNOVA‑2454 signatures ≈242–248 bytes, so ML‑DSA vs ECDSA size drives latency and deployment tradeoffs.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Quantum-safe TLS intro
- 1:47Quantum threat timeline
- 6:41NIST PQC standardization
- 9:08TLS jobs and quantum impact
- 16:35Demo: OpenSSL 3.5 PQC
- 29:21Demo: Open Quantum Safe provider
- 40:55Key takeaways
- 41:58Q&A: Deployment & IoT
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