Is your HSM quantum-ready? Here’s what you need to know!
summary
Claims that every deployed HSM must be replaced unless it uses quantum-safe root keys and algorithms, supports quantum-safe firmware updates, and exposes PQC to applications as built-in, not bolted-on. FIPS 140 validation (2/3) and RSA-signed firmware or QRNG entropy do not make an HSM quantum-safe. Examples: HSM-to-HSM transfer of an MLD DSA key still often uses classic crypto, attestation signatures revert to ECDSA/RSA, and backup/firmware chains remain classic—these are functional gaps that must be redesigned.
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chapters (9)
- 0:00Welcome
- 0:44HSMs must be quantum-safe
- 4:20HSMs guard digital economy
- 9:00HSMs provide and consume crypto
- 12:11Limitations of HSM validation
- 15:47Future-proofing HSMs for quantum
- 19:20Crypto agility in HSM design
- 23:12Detecting quantum-safe HSMs
- 25:19Q&A: Certification challenges
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