Achieving Quantum Readiness: A Comprehensive Approach
summary
Claims that public-key crypto (RSA, DH, ECC) will be broken lead to concrete steps: inventory keys, prioritize long-lived device identities (10–50 year lifetimes), and plan migrations to NIST finalists (Kyber, Dilithium, SPHINCS+, Falcon) with lattice vs hash tradeoffs. Stateful hash schemes (XMSS/LMS) use Merkle trees with heights 5–25 (2^H keys) and require strict state handling; NIST SP 800-208 forbids key export and NSA warns no key export. HSMs last ~10 years, create vendor lock‑in, and industry targets lattice standardization by summer–fall 2024. harvest now decrypt later
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chapters (6)
- 0:00Post-Quantum Cryptography intro
- 1:01PQC theory and algorithms
- 10:07Hash and lattice-based PQC
- 20:29Operationalizing PQC
- 30:11Hybrid crypto agility
- 37:09Q&A on PQC
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