Another Digital ID: Privacy-preserving Humanitarian Aid Distribution
summary
Decentralized token system stores entitlements on smart cards with household keys (or smartphones using anonymous credentials), uses PRF-derived one‑time tags to catch double‑dipping, and signs committed entitlements so auditors verify only an aggregated total via homomorphic commitments for aggregate audits. Prototype implements cloning for household members, revocation for lost cards, and smartphone extensions with heavier crypto; it proves the concept but deployment stalls on funding, logistics and shifting humanitarian priorities rather than technical feasibility.
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chapters (27)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:06Tech's dual role
- 2:10Aid without user choice
- 3:13Traditional aid workflow
- 5:00Digital aid requirements
- 6:03Traditional registration
- 8:52Distribution and audit
- 11:46Centralized limitations
- 13:33Biometric risks
- 15:05Decentralized system design
- 16:32Smart card registration
- 18:02Smart card distribution
- 19:50Privacy-preserving audit
- 22:59Smartphone trade-offs
- 24:04System benefits and verification
- 24:47Collaborators and impact
- 25:51Q&A
- 26:15Deduplication and recovery
- 32:02Worker training costs
- 34:12Lost smart card handling
- 36:20Software updates
- 39:13Smartphones vs smart cards
- 41:46Deployment challenges
- 43:08Economic limitations
- 45:12Applying to other domains
- 47:04Privacy threat model
- 49:49Future work and closing
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