Quantum-Safe Secure Boot: How hard can it be?
summary
Claims that secure boot must start transitioning now because of a 2030 deprecation deadline for RSA/ECDSA, documents conflicting national requirements that force either full PQC or PQ/T hybrid support, and shows that hybrid verification doubles algorithm count, memory, latency and energy in devices. Analysis finds no vendor HSM offering an end-to-end PQC signing workflow, flags mLDSA as feasible, Falcon as hard to protect against side-channels, and concludes a hardware–software codesign is necessary.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Quantum-safe secure boot intro
- 1:03Speaker motivation
- 3:12Why secure boot matters
- 5:20Regulatory timelines vs requirements
- 7:52Algorithm selection challenges
- 10:23Backend signature pain
- 12:08Crypto agility and security
- 14:18Optimization goals
- 15:20Hardware vs software trade-offs
- 16:22Key challenges summary
- 17:06Q&A
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