Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in Embedded Linux Systems
summary
Argues embedded Linux needs PQC now because future quantum attacks can break RSA/ECC and weaken AES, and devices often run 10–20 years without updates. Shows a concrete migration: replace RSA secure‑boot signatures on NXP i.MX boards with NIST‑approved Crystals‑Dilithium for quantum‑resistant signatures, fuse the public key in OTP, verify hashes at boot; recommends OpenSSL 3.5+ and lists Kyber, Dilithium, SPHINCS+, Falcon, HQC as accepted options and XMSS for hash‑based needs.
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chapters (14)
- 0:00Post-quantum cryptography intro
- 1:24Linux in embedded security
- 3:07Embedded security challenges
- 5:36Current crypto risks
- 10:38Quantum threat to crypto
- 16:55Post-quantum cryptography fundamentals
- 19:46NIST PQC for embedded
- 21:31Secure boot PQC fix
- 24:01Transitioning embedded systems to post-quantum algorithms
- 27:35Call to action
- 28:42Q&A: Harvest now decrypt later
- 30:50Q&A: Hardware vs software PQC
- 32:39Q&A: Secure boot trust
- 34:05Q&A: Quantum superposition
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