BDoS: Blockchain Denial of Service
summary
Claim: publishing only block headers and proving prior work makes rational miners prefer to stop and can halt a proof‑of‑work chain far cheaper than 51% attacks. Analysis uses Markov-chain utilities and simulations that match; concrete thresholds depend on base profitability (typical mining profitability ~2× OPEX) and attacker size (a ~30% attacker can halt the network when profitability is low). Proposed implementations: SPV mining exploitation, compact blocks relay or an Ethereum‑based commitment; mitigations include Ethereum uncle rewards and frequent difficulty adjustment.
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chapters (15)
- 0:00Introduction
- 1:01Motivations for DoS attacks
- 3:25Mechanics of the attack
- 5:51SPV mining and incentives
- 8:20System modeling
- 10:31Defining game utility
- 13:51Attack execution scenarios
- 16:44Markov chain analysis
- 20:27Equilibrium strategy
- 24:37Profitability thresholds
- 30:06Impact of miner size
- 34:48Defense and credibility
- 38:24Mitigation techniques
- 41:19Implementation strategies
- 46:47Final conclusions
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