Game Theory Applied to Mining Pools, Token Offering, Dao, and Consensus Protocols
summary
Three short game‑theory results: empirical + model work shows mining pools arise for risk sharing but never monopolize, pools with sticky “passive” miners charge higher fees, miners optimally diversify, and pool emergence explains up to ~10× higher global hash‑rate; a demo site computes optimal hash‑rate splits and regressions match theory. A second paper models ICO tokens as commitment devices—transparent, platform‑specific tokens solve a coordination failure via forward‑induction reasoning. A third proposes equal profit‑sharing contracts that boost investment by aggregating private signals; implementation as on‑chain contracts is feasible; consensus analysis is ongoing.
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chapters (19)
- 0:00Introduction
- 2:02Mining Pools
- 4:51Why do mining pools arise
- 13:37Game theory for mining pools
- 18:09Increase in hash rates
- 19:58Static mining pools
- 27:39Initial core offerings
- 29:25Model of a platform
- 31:27Solution concept
- 32:06Types of Alice
- 38:29Token Offering
- 41:42Token Performance
- 43:34Security Tokens
- 44:14Forward Induction
- 49:44Participation Cost
- 50:51Wisdom of the Crowd
- 53:59Common Stock
- 54:50Equal Sharing
- 57:22Limited Liability
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