Blockchain Intermediation
summary
Argues that miners function as de facto intermediaries and gives concrete examples and open questions: miners can rewind transactions (DAO fork), mining-pool operators decide block ordering and enable front-running/transaction prioritization, a Zcash case suggests deliberate transaction censorship, and pool contracts plus upgrade practices reveal centralized control and weak cybersecurity. Cites Flash Boys 2.0 and regulator stances (FinCEN, BitLicense) as mismatched to on-chain realities, points to empirical measures needed (wallet linking, pool ownership, off-chain payments, hashpower distribution) and asks whether game theory suffices instead of regulation.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Introduction
- 8:24Miners as intermediaries
- 14:07The power of users
- 18:59Mining pool operators
- 22:37Conclusions
- 28:45Regulations
- 31:50Transmission of Value
- 33:20Blockchain Fact List
- 34:50Research Agenda
- 38:15Mining Tools
- 42:15Side Payments
- 46:35Upper Layers
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