A Security RISC? The State of Microarchitectural Attacks on RISC-V
summary
Analysis targets two commercial RISC‑V cores (Allwinner D1 / c906 and SiFive U74) and releases working proof‑of‑concepts on GitHub. Findings: split instruction/data caches prevent classic flush+reload but a new flush-and-fault trick (misaligned jump + fault handling) restores cache timing; the RISC‑V standard leaves unprivileged performance counters (cycles, retired instructions) so a timing scan reliably performs a KASLR break via page‑walk timing; speculative prefetching creates an instruction‑cache side channel, and on a newer board a full transient‑execution Spectre on COTS RISC‑V exploit successfully leaks memory.
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chapters (15)
- 0:00Microarchitectural attacks on RISC-V
- 1:06Why security matters
- 3:59CPU vulnerabilities state-of-the-art
- 6:29RISC-V open-source alternative
- 8:14Analyzing RISC-V hardware cores
- 9:58CPU basics and attack vectors
- 13:28Flush and Reload attacks deep dive
- 17:43Cache attacks on RISC-V
- 22:17Performance counters attack surfaces
- 26:14Breaking kernel ASLR with counters
- 29:49Spectre basics and branch prediction
- 33:43Exploiting speculative prefetching
- 35:49First Spectre on RISC-V
- 38:00Summary and future outlook
- 40:51Q&A
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