Collide+Power: The Evolution of Software-based Power Side-Channels Attacks
summary
Collide+Power demonstrates a generic software-only power side channel that targets shared CPU hardware (cache memory subsystem) rather than specific algorithms, models leakage with Hamming-distance plus cross/self terms (0.9 correlation to measurements), and recovers secrets by manipulating attacker-controlled cache lines. It uses Platypus (RAPL reads) or indirect signals like heart split GPU/CPU throttling; measured rates are about 5 bits/hour for MDS-style RAPL traces and ~1 bit/hour for Meltdown-style traces, a live demo recovers a secret string, and fixes require either privileged energy interfaces or costly hardware redesign.
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:48Motivation
- 2:52Roadmap
- 3:59Technology
- 6:12Challenges
- 6:29Platypus
- 13:06Heart Spit
- 19:50CollidePower
- 25:41Generic Attacks
- 33:16Mitigation
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