A new categorization system for Side-channel attacks on mo...
summary
Claim: an unprivileged app uses CPU-induced power bursts over a USB charging cable to exfiltrate data without using the data lines. Implementation: a proof‑of‑concept app called power snitch uses wakelock to create bursts, the charging-station side records power traces, applies low-pass filtering, threshold detection and decodes bits. Evaluation: tested on Nexus 4/5/6 and Samsung S5, transmitting 512-bit payloads with measurable bit‑error rates. Also proposes a three-axis categorization: active/passive, physical/logical, local/vicinity/remote.
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chapters (17)
- 0:00Intro
- 2:36Motivation
- 6:05Contributions
- 7:36Setup
- 11:15Stealth Mode
- 12:46Data Exfiltration
- 15:19Android Demon
- 17:56Data Filtering
- 19:16Peak Detection
- 20:15Results
- 21:35Incognito
- 22:54Sidechannel attacks
- 25:47The paper
- 27:07Traditional sidechannel categorization
- 29:06The 5 key enablers
- 31:02New categorization system
- 32:15Grid
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