The Dangers of Key Reuse: Practical Attacks on IPsec IKE
summary
Reuses a single RSA key pair across IKEv1 modes and IKEv2 signatures to turn PKCS#1 v1.5 padding into a Bleichenbacher oracle that lets a MITM decrypt RSA‑encrypted nonces, derive session keys and impersonate a peer. Finds vulnerable firmware in Cisco, Huawei, Clavister and ZyXEL (eg. CVE-2018-0131), demonstrates an offline PSK dictionary attack and cross‑protocol signature abuses. Practical limits: testing with 1024‑bit keys, ~850 ops/sec and 60s timeouts yields attacks needing ~19k queries (≈25% success) and a signature attack success ~22%; patches are available.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Start
- 3:48Protocol Itself
- 5:24Four Authentication Methods in V1
- 5:45Revised Mode
- 7:03How Does Such a Encryption Look like
- 8:03Padding Oracle Attack
- 12:53Cisco Ios
- 16:30Is an Attack Realistic
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