Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys
summary
Shows that 802.11 group keys are predictable, recoverable and abusible: Mediatek routers use a weak jiffies-based RNG so predicting group keys is practical (GPU search breaks keys in 3–5 minutes); a rogue AP can force RC4/TKIP during the 4‑way handshake and, given about 2^31 handshakes, RC4 attacks recover a 128‑bit GTK; with a known GTK an attacker poisons MACs to decrypt or inject client unicast traffic; proposes using Wi‑Fi spectral noise as a better RNG.
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chapters (10)
- 0:00Start
- 0:14What Are Wi-Fi Group Keys
- 1:59How Is the Group Key in a Wireless Network Generated
- 5:14Example Random Number Generator
- 6:37Entropy Sources
- 9:01Random Number Generator
- 17:40Counter Measures
- 23:23Spectral Scan
- 24:24Conclusion
- 26:11Opportunistic Wireless Encryption
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