Faster Malicious 2-Party Secure Computation with Online/Offline Dual Execution
summary
Claim: a practical malicious 2PC protocol that shifts heavy work offline and runs extremely fast online by adapting Kolesnikov et al. to an online/offline dual-execution model, implementing cut-and-choose with bins and an adapted Pinkas‑type PSI for reconciliation. Prototype on AWS evaluates AES 1024× at 5.1ms offline + 1.3ms online amortized (vs Lindell&Riva 74ms+7ms), uses an input‑consistency check that requires almost no crypto online, and can trade leakage for 2.4ms+1.0ms with a 2^-20 single‑bit leak.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Malicious 2-party computation intro
- 1:13Security against malicious adversaries
- 3:40Yao’s garbled circuits
- 6:12Dual execution for malicious inputs
- 7:14Cut-and-choose for circuit validation
- 10:01Online/offline dual execution
- 13:50Input consistency in circuits
- 14:51Private set intersection details
- 17:43Performance benchmarks
- 19:48Comparison with prior work
- 20:51Security and performance gains
- 21:57Q&A
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