Sanctum: Minimal Hardware Extensions for Strong Software Isolation
summary
Claims provable enclave isolation that also blocks cache timing attacks by adding a tiny security monitor in software plus small hardware at block interfaces, implemented on a Rocket RISC‑V core and evaluated with a cycle‑accurate CPU plus cache simulator on SPEC workloads. Enclaves use page‑coloring style cache partitioning (DRAM regions) and a signing enclave holds attestation keys; no hyper‑threading support. Measured overheads are modest (worst case ~18%, with mcf the next worst), and the monitor’s RSA attestation keys can be cached across boots.
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chapters (14)
- 0:00Introduction
- 0:23Sanctums Goal
- 1:44Trusted Computing
- 3:42Trusted Computing Systems
- 4:35Enclaves
- 15:10Protection
- 16:34Scale
- 17:04Cash Timing
- 17:49Partitioning
- 18:23Address Translation
- 18:40Page Color
- 20:32Page Tables
- 21:56Rocket Core
- 22:30Test Results
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