BurnBox: Self-Revocable Encryption in a World Of Compelled Access
summary
BurnBox delivers self-revocable encryption for cloud files: per-file symmetric keys live in an on-device erasable index and a public-key “restoration ciphertext” lets an offline restoration key recover revoked files later. It uses trusted hardware to rotate master keys for secure deletion, a FUSE prototype that uses mostly symmetric crypto for good performance, and a formal proof that leakage is limited to a pseudonymous operation history. It requires an offline restoration cache inaccessible at compulsion and does not protect against surprise searches or OS/app metadata leaks.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00The problem of compelled access
- 2:11Introducing Burn Box
- 3:22Limitations of current systems
- 4:37Decoupling security from lying
- 5:55Threat model assumptions
- 8:08High-level system design
- 10:04Technical challenges
- 12:40Erasable index implementation
- 16:21Formal security analysis
- 17:47Prototype and limitations
- 19:44Conclusion and Q&A
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