Taking the 737 to the MAX! Nick Means at
summary
Flight telemetry and the NTSC report show a faulty angle of attack sensor repeatedly triggers the new software system MCAS, causing uncommanded nose‑down trim that kills 189 people on Lion Air and then again on Ethiopian Airlines; the automated trim exceeds manual recovery and leads to a global grounding for one year and eight months. Regulators and manufacturers then change certification rules, require dual‑sensor agreement and limit MCAS to a single activation, and operators finally insist on simulator training and system‑level fixes.
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chapters (15)
- 0:00Welcome
- 1:24Content warning
- 3:10737 design origins
- 8:20Lion Air Flight 610
- 13:33Boeing's MCAS discovery
- 16:43Airbus A320neo pressure
- 19:30737 MAX birth
- 21:58Engine placement challenges
- 23:23FAA MCAS certification
- 26:14Pilot training gaps
- 28:43Ethiopian Flight 302
- 30:07Systems thinking analysis
- 35:23Software engineering lessons
- 37:53Post-crash improvements
- 39:01Reassurance for passengers flying on 737 MAX
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