A Systems Approach to Safety and Cybersecurity
summary
Presents safety and security as control problems solved top-down with the STAMP/STPA method instead of component-failure thinking; shows concrete fixes (mechanical interlocks, redundancy, controller design) for examples like a torpedo that shut down, the Boeing 787 battery-ventilation interaction, the 737 MAX sensor/automation fight, and Stuxnet’s overspeed of centrifuges (inadvertent launch and 100 million lines of code illustrate scale). Reports empirical results: STPA finds more critical requirement flaws, costs orders of magnitude less in trials, and a contractor claims 15–20% ROI on a large program.
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chapters (11)
- 0:00Intro
- 3:27General Definition of "Safety"
- 7:58Boeing 787 Lithium Battery Fires
- 16:02Analytic Decomposition (2)
- 20:46Controller Controlling emergent properties
- 23:24Safety as a Control Problem (vs. Failure Problem)
- 29:44Integrated Approach to Safety and Security (Col. Bill Young)
- 37:43Ballistic Missile Defense System (MDA)
- 40:09Navy Escort Vessels (Lt. Blake Abrecht)
- 41:29Improving the Standard Risk Matrix
- 43:32Summary: A Systems Approach to Safety and Security
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