ARE DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS DOING ENOUGH TO PROTECT DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM AND PRIVACY FROM THE ...
summary
Argues that purpose limitation as atomic unit should become the forensic tool for merger and abuse reviews, showing how Google fines barely dent revenues and how the Fitbit acquisition escaped effective limits; proposes companies produce processing-purpose spreadsheets so DG COMP can model what happens when those sheets “make babies”; notes the DMA adds structural remedies (including forced divestiture) but warns enforcement capacity and time lags still let gatekeepers consolidate power.
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chapters (8)
- 0:00Introduction
- 4:18Data protection vs competition law
- 20:19Why competition law matters
- 33:24Digital Markets Act
- 43:19Monopolies threat to democracy
- 53:13Enforcement challenges in EU
- 1:04:32Prohibiting harmful models
- 1:17:29Closing remarks
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