Job Matching under Constraints
summary
Characterizes exactly which hiring rules keep firms’ demand substitutability under transferable salaries: feasible sets that are interval constraints (ceilings, floors, and combinations plus “always/never hire” subsets) preserve substitutes; type‑specific quotas can break it. Uses demand correspondences from firm revenue functions, constructive discrete→continuum existence proofs, and lattice arguments to get a lattice of equilibria, constancy of each firm’s workforce across equilibria, and weak‑set comparative statics. Assumes unbounded transfers, “money matters” continuity, and feasibility compatibility; no budget caps.
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chapters (6)
- 0:00Start
- 11:43Answer
- 17:26Additional Research Questions
- 22:42The Model: Constraints
- 27:08The Model: Utilities and Revenues
- 43:20Ongoing Project: Transfer Policy
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