Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars
summary
Argues that combining frictionless time-dependent tolls (GPS/license-plate systems like Singapore’s 2020 rollout) with practical carpooling matching produces large welfare gains: with a simple Vickrey bottleneck example (capacity 60, demand 120) tolls alone can eliminate congestion but are politically unpopular, while modest tolls (~Delta/2) plus two-person carpools induce universal carpooling and the efficient outcome. Presents a model with trips, segment capacities, rider prices P and regulator tolls R; any feasible, stable, budget-balanced, market-clearing outcome maximizes social surplus, and a divisible approximation guarantees existence.
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chapters (12)
- 0:00Intro
- 7:50Carpooling
- 10:00Selfdriving cars
- 12:10Autonomous transportation and carpooling
- 21:40Carpooling and road pricing
- 28:30Inefficiencies
- 35:30Model
- 39:10Valuation
- 41:47Outcome
- 43:48Main Result
- 44:40Problem
- 46:03Question
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