Design of Lotteries and Waitlists for Affordable Housing Allocation

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Model shows standard waitlists and independent lotteries yield the same matching probability, match-value distribution and expected wait under iid preferences and a continuum population, using a dynamic MDP framework with exit probability delta and geometric versus deterministic offer timings. Introducing participation costs breaks equivalence and a common lottery (one global rank) raises value per match; tradeoff remains with targeting the neediest. Notes: Amsterdam has ~40% social stock, Singapore ~80%, and allowing trades or keeping queue spots improves efficiency.

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" chapters (12)

1. 0:00Start
2. 0:17Design of Lotteries and Waitlists for Affordable Housing Allocation
3. 0:39Types of Affordable Housing
4. 3:32How is Affordable Housing Allocated?
5. 5:58How Should Affordable Housing be Allocated?
6. 9:44Model Discrete Time. Each period: 1. New arrivals
7. 19:41Matching Rule: Waitlist (lose spot)
8. 20:29Matching Rule: Independent Lotteries
9. 42:09Common lottery vs independent lotteries? Theorem. A common lottery yields higher value per match for every agent.
10. 44:20Targeting need: who matches?
11. 46:26What to do?
12. 49:16Next step: take to practice!