Facilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms

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" summary

Model has dynamic arrivals and departures, idiosyncratic match values discoverable only by paying screening cost C, and agents solve simple MDPs so equilibria are stationary mean field outcomes. Small/medium/large C produce three regimes where one side proposes and the other waits, symmetry breaks. If one side arrives ≥25% faster it is forced into proposing and suffers; prevent men proposing (Bumble style) can raise average welfare by about 10% in examples. Hiding men’s tier labels plus blocking proposals yields a Pareto improvement and still helps as C → 0.

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" chapters (23)

1. 0:00Intro
2. 0:40Matching markets
3. 1:48Search on online platforms
4. 5:23Research Questions
5. 5:55Search design: the (heterosexual) dating world
6. 8:28Contributions and findings Introduce a modeling framework with
7. 10:08Contributions and findings Introduce a modelling framework with Dynamic arrivals and departures
8. 10:38Related work
9. 12:01Model (no platform interventions)
10. 14:19Search and matching events following a clock ring
11. 18:43Strategies and Platform interventions
12. 21:30Equilibrium concept: stationary equilibrium
13. 22:32Objective
14. 22:47Analysis overview
15. 24:41Warm-up: Symmetric market
16. 31:25Unbalanced markets (different arrival rates)
17. 34:42Back to Bumble...
18. 37:07Incorporating vertical differentiation
19. 38:03Theorem: No intervention unique equilibrium
20. 40:01Intervention 1: Force women to propose
21. 41:34Intervention II: Force women to propose and hide quality info
22. 42:10Vertical differentiation: summary
23. 43:14Wrap-up

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