Quality Selection in Two-Sided Markets: A Price Discrimination Approach
summary
Reduction shows platform quality selection maps to a price-discrimination reduction: two stylized two-sided models (sellers choose quantity under platform-set prices, or sellers set prices under Bertrand competition) produce menus of (price, expected quality) offerings. Main claim: when buyer-type mass times type is convex (M·F(M) convex) and the feasible menus satisfy a technical one-rich condition, a single-menu (keep top, remove bottom) is optimal; proofs use equilibrium implementability, Jensen’s inequality, and constructed counterexamples when convexity fails.
AI-written summary · about
chapters (14)
- 0:00Intro
- 1:18Motivation: Quality selection
- 3:24Outline
- 7:15Formal model of seller quality
- 11:46Information structures: Example
- 16:11The game
- 26:37Sellers and buyers
- 28:13Equilibrium
- 32:19From information structures to price discrimination
- 33:20A price discrimination problem
- 40:21Remarks on theorem
- 42:36Graphical intuition
- 43:32Application to market models
- 47:47Conclusion
related talks
44mClearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative signals and Match Recommendations
52mOptimal Growth in Two-Sided Markets
44mOnline Advertisements and Online Algorithms
29mClearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations
44mFacilitating the Search for Partners on Matching Platforms
01h 38mRidesharing
46mJob Matching under Constraints
56mMarket Design and Computer-Assisted Markets: An Economist's Perspective