Credible Mechanism

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" summary

Defines auctioneer incentive compatibility (credible = auctioneer has no profitable deviation that looks legal to any bidder) and models ad-exchange-style private communication under IID private values with a Myerson reserve and discrete approximation. Proves static+credible ⇔ essentially a first-price auction, credible+strategy-proof ⇔ ascending auction, yielding a trilemma: any two of {static, strategy-proof, credible} pin down a standard format. Uses messaging games, safe deviations (chandelier bids), and virtual-value calculations; explains why exchanges shift toward first-price and when ascending rules self-police.

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" chapters (15)

1. 0:00Intro
2. 3:25Chandelier Bidding
3. 4:21Auctions by Telephone
4. 5:19Incentive compatibility - for the auctioneer?
5. 6:58Bending the Rules
6. 8:51Taking the opposite benchmark
7. 13:27Benchmark model: Symmetric independent private values
8. 19:55Implementation via Extensive Forms
9. 23:26A Messaging Game
10. 24:58How the Auctioneer Can Deviate
11. 27:38Related literature
12. 28:07credible static optimal auctions
13. 35:21Discretize the distribution
14. 36:13How to deal with ties?
15. 36:55A credible strategy-proof auction